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Industry 4.0 is the connection of intelligent objects with information technology and thus with the 
internet. This leads to new fields of application in information technology. To protect intelligent objects 
security approaches are necessary. Several security standards already exist for ICT, but not for Industry 
4.0. The present paper considers standards to conduct threat analysis and risk analysis of ICT security 
based on a literature review. A catalogue of criteria relevant to such standards for Industry 4.0 is 
developed which serves as the basis of their evaluation. Thirteen standards are identified as relevant 
regarding the criteria, among them IT-Grundschutz.  
 




The interconnection between information and communication technology (ICT) and 
industrial machinery leads to increased confrontation of information security in 
manufacturing (Rüßmann et al., 2015). This combination of ICT and intelligent objects, 
such as machines and products, is called Industry 4.0 (Lasi et al., 2014).  
The aim of information security is the protection of any type of information, their 
sources, and the permanent maintenance of a certain safety level. Information security 
is exposed to continuous changes, therefore, it is essential to manage change actively 
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2017). 
 
To establish fundamental information security mechanisms, various standards of 
information security management system (ISMS), such as ISO/IEC 27001, ITIL, and 
COBIT, can be used (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2017; 
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2008; Susanto et al., 2011).  
In this paper, various standards of ISMS and contiguous fields are assessed regarding 
their support of a threat and risk analysis, which leads to the main research question:  
• RQ1: Which well-known standards consider threat and risk analysis in information security? 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate standards of information security for Industry 
4.0. For this evaluation, a set of well-known criteria is necessary (Vorster and 
Labuschagne, 2005).  
• RQ2: Which criteria can be used to evaluate well-known standards for threat and risk 
analysis in information security? 
 
The evaluation of standards thus requires a catalogue of criteria to show how the 
standards deal with threat and risk analysis of information security in Industry 4.0. 
• RQ3: Which results are provided with the criteria catalogues regarding to threats and risk 
analysis in Industry 4.0?  
 
The following section contains theoretical foundations to compare methods in threat 
and risk analysis of ICT Security. Section 3 describes the methodology of this paper. In 
section 4, criteria of threat and risk analysis are applied to the identified standards. 
Finally, the results of the evaluation based on the criteria catalogues show the overall 
suitability of the standards.  
 
2.0 Theoretical Background 
The following section presents theoretical foundations of security in information 
systems, Industry 4.0, and risk analysis.  
 
2.1 Security in Information Systems 
Information security concentrates on the protection of information, their source and 
permanent maintenance of a certain security level (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, 2020). Information security comprises the fundamental values 
integrity, confidentiality, and availability (ISO/IEC 27002:2013). Integrity depicts 
correctness of information. Confidentiality addresses the protection of personal data. 
Availability describes whether a function is existent and therefore executable as 
intended. (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2020) 
International Telecommunication Union (2008, p. 2) defines cyber security as “the 
collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk 
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies 
that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user's assets.” 
A subset of information security is ICT security, which addresses the protection of 
collected information and their processing in electronic systems (Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2017). As Figure 1 depicts, ICT security 
comprises safety, security, and privacy. 
 
Figure 1. Definition of ICT Security 
 
In automation, safety describes the protection against failures with inadvertent and 
undesirable behaviour in software or system (Kornecki and Zalewski, 2010). Security 
involves the protection against intentional attacks on software or system, which violate 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Avižienis et al., 2004; Elmaghraby and 
Losavio, 2014). This paper focuses on security and on the identification of 
vulnerabilities but does not consider privacy that concentrates on data protection against 
third parties (Parent, 1983). 
 
2.2 Industry 4.0 
Industry 4.0 is defined as the fourth industrial revolution, that focusses on networking 
industrial computation systems with physical machines and processes (Lasi et al., 
2014). This networking is defined by two development directions: application-pull and 
technology-push. Application-pull describes changes in society, economics and 
politics, such as shortening development periods, increasing flexibility, and resource 
efficiency. Technology-push extends well-known and used technology in private areas 
to an industrial context, such as automation, digitalisation, and networking. (Lasi et al., 
2014)  
Usually, cyber-physical systems (CPS) were utilised to integrate this networking. 
Whereas CPS do not perform in controlled environments, the robustness of CPS has to 
be enhanced for them to be able to deal with unexpected states (Lee, 2008). 
Industry 4.0 systems are subjected to threats and consequently to risks. A threat is an 
incident that might cause damage on subjects or objects. In ICT security, threats can 
cause damages to confidentiality, integrity, and availability, triggered by human 
misconduct (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2020; Eckert, 2018).  
A risk rates a threat by calculating the product of probability of occurrence and impact 
of the potential damage. (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 2020)  
 
2.3 Threats and Risk Analysis 
The identification of threats and their rating is necessary to minimise the damage by 
potential attacks (Peltier, 2005). A structured procedure for identification and rating of 
these attacks is part of a risk analysis (ISO/IEC 27001:2013). 
A threat analysis systematically identifies threats, which can cause damages to an 
organisation, technical object or user. Potential causes of threats are not only the 
behavior of a person or an organisation (so called aggressor), but also technical defects. 
For a complete threat identification, fundamental knowledge about vulnerabilities and 
security weaknessess of the considered system is required (Eckert, 2018; Peltier, 2005) 
to determine threats and aggressors. Thus, the results of the threat identification are 
potential threats and aggressors. 
A threat analysis is a component of a risk analysis. A risk analysis determines risk 
values based on the identified and assessed threats. The risk values are calculated with 
a likelihood of occurrence of the threat 𝑡𝑡 and an estimated amount of damage 𝑑𝑑. The 
value of risk 𝑟𝑟 is defined as follows: 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑑𝑑 × 𝑡𝑡 (Eckert, 2018; Peltier, 2005). 
The estimated likelihood of occurrence consists of an estimated effort and an estimated 
benefit of a successful attack. To estimate the effort, penetration tests are applied. A 
penetration test is defined as a simulation of an aggressor’s attack behavior to identify 
potential vulnerabilities and defects of a system (Eckert, 2018). 
The estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of threat 𝑡𝑡 comprises the estimated 
amount of damage 𝑑𝑑 and an estimated value of the vulnerability (Eckert, 2018). The 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) determines dependencies among 
actual properties of the considered vulnerability, index progression of time, and explicit 
technology infrastructure (FIRST.ORG Inc.). Therefore, the risk analysis is affected by 
the described model of the aggressor (Eckert, 2018). 
 
The estimated amount of damage a threat can cause consists of primary damage and 
secondary damage. Primary damages, such as costs of production downtime and 
recovery, can generally be quantified whereas secondary damages are caused by 
consideration of long-time effects, such as loss of image (Eckert, 2018). 
 
2.4 Standards for ICT Security 
A standard defines a consistent, recognised and established approach. In ICT security, 
standards depict an approach to protect the digital environment from uncertainty. An 
established practice-oriented standard of ICT security in Industry 4.0 does not yet exist 
(Hofmann and Rüsch, 2017; Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung). The 
variety of ICT security standards reveals a large amount of potential standards for ICT 
security in Industry 4.0, which are evaluated in this paper regarding to their usefulness.  
 
3.0 Methodology 
The approach of the methodology is shown in Figure 2 and is broken down into three 
phases: literature review, criteria catalogues, and evaluation. The literature review 
considers standards for threat and risk analysis in ICT security. The second phase deals 
with the development of the criteria catalogue and is subdivided into three subphases, 
namely definition of criteria for the criteria catalogues, evaluation of the criteria 
regarding to their relevance, and applying the determined standards of the literature 
review at the criteria catalogues. The evaluation focuses on the interpretation and rating 
of the results from the criteria catalogues. 
 
 
Figure 2. Approach of Methodology 
 
3.1 Literature Review 
To identify relevant standards, a literature review was conducted according to Webster 
and Watson (2002) to evaluate standards regarding to threat and risk analysis of ICT 
security. To this purpose, standards of ICT security in different subjects, such as ISMS, 
further common ICT security standards and identified standards of the project IUNO, 
were examined. The project IUNO is a national reference project that focused on the 
identifiaction of methods of risk evaluation for ICT security in Industry 4.0. These 
methods were considered as standards for ICT security and Industry 4.0 (Fraunhofer 
SIT, 2016; Fraunhofer IESE). Through backward search to these standards (Webster 
and Watson, 2002), suitability regarding to Industry 4.0 and ICT security was reviewed 
and further standards were identified. In addition, databases of institutions, authorities, 
and consortia in the field ICT and contiguous areas, such as engineering, were examined 
regarding approaches for evaluating risk of ICT systems.  
The literature review used the keywords standards, ISMS, risk analysis, threat analysis, 
ICT security, and the German translations of these terms.  
The identified standards are categorised in the categories open standards, fee-based 
standards, practical guidance, service management, and external provider. The 
standards were assigned to the most suited category. Note that the categories are not 
necessarily distinct. Fee-based standards are mainly international standards, which 
could be relevant to global institutions. Open standards are partly international and 
partly national standards, which are freely available and could thus be relevant to 
institutions with a low budget. Practical guidance is defined as further standards in 
particular subjects, which describes concrete implementation guidance and concrete 
threats. Service management includes well-known standards of threat and risk analysis 
in service management. Standards of external providers describe the implementation of 
case-specific threat and risk analyses by those providers. 
All in all, 62 standards were examined by the literature review. Seven of these standards 
were excluded beforehand, since these standards were either replaced, withdrawn or 
only a reference to other standards. The standards ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 
were collected as ISO/IEC 27000 family. Therefore, only 54 standards were considered 
further. The mentioned catagories and the related standards are contained in Table 1. 
  
Category Description Matching Standards 
Open 
standards 
Free access  Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) 
IT-Grundschutz (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, 2020) 
Cyber-Sicherheits-Check (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 
der Informationstechnik and ISACA Germany Chapter 
e.V., 2014) 
Cyber-Sicherheits-Exposition (Allianz für Cyber-
Sicherheit, 2018) 
PCIDSS (Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
Council, 2019) 
VdS 10000 
FitSM (IT Education Management Organisation, o.D.) 
FITSAF (Computer Security Division, 2000) 
NIST SP 800-34 (Swanson et al., 2010) 
NIST SP 800-82 (Stouffer et al., 2015) 
NIST SP 1500-4r2 (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2019) 
NIST IR 8183A (Stouffer et al., 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) 
NIST IR 8228 (Boeckl et al., 2019) 















ICT security in 
industrial 
automation 
NE 153 (NAMUR Working Group WG 4.18 









Method of risk 
evaluation 
CORAS (Lund et al., 2011) 
Context of urban 
regeneration 







SDL (Microsoft Corporation, 2012) 
ITIL (Limited, 2019) 
COBIT (ISACA, 2018) 
TOGAF (The Open Group) 
MOF (Microsoft Corporation, 2008) 





TISAX-Modell (Gleich, 2019) 
VSA Questionnaire (Vendor Security Alliance) 
Table 1. Frameworks 
 
3.2 Definition of Criteria Catalogues 
After identifying various standards, criteria catalogues were conducted to rate these 
standards regarding to suitability. These criteria catalogues were used to evaluate in an 
identical way and on the same level of abstraction. Three catalogues were used: 
• Criteria Catalogue in General 
• Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis 
• Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis 
 
The criteria of the criteria catalogues were found via brainstorming. Main criteria of 
these catalogues are Industry 4.0, ICT security, threat analysis, and risk analysis. The 
results of a first brainstorming were too generic, hence, further criteria were determined. 
These criteria were then evaluated as to whether the standards are suitable for threat 
analysis or for risk analysis. Further, the criteria catalogues evaluate how exactly the 
regarded standard describes the approach of the analyses.  
The Criteria Catalogue in General considers no explicit criteria of Industry 4.0 whereas 
the remaining two criteria catalogues consider criteria of Industry 4.0. 
All three criteria catalogues depict the criteria name, provider, and relevance of the 
regarded standard. The criterion relevance distinguishes the following characteristics: 
• Relevant for Industry 4.0, ICT security, and threat and risk analysis  
• Possibly later relevant for Industry 4.0 and/or ICT security, but not to threat and risk analysis 
• Not relevant for Industry 4.0, ICT security, threat analysis, risk analysis, or a replaced 
standard 
 
Relevant Standards, which utilise the same approach and receive identical quantitative 
rating such as sheets of VDI/VDE 2182 are summarised as one standard.  
In each criteria catalogues, all as relevant identified standards were ranked based on 
their relevance and relative closeness and sorted in descending order by the relative 
closeness with a range of values between 0 (lowest usefulness) and 1 (highest 
usefulness). 
Considered standards, which fulfil the criterion of being not relevant, are either too 
conceptual, without any Industry 4.0 context or do not describe threat and risk analysis.  
  
Further criteria, which all criteria catalogues contain, are explanation, quantitative 
rating, and conducted analysis: 
• Explanation: The explanation clarifies the result of the criterion relevance. Both criteria of 
relevance and explanation were considered separately for every criteria catalogue. 
• Quantitative rating: This criterion is calculated by the extent of the relevance for the 
examined standard and is indicated as a relative closeness out of all considered criteria 
within the regarded criteria catalogue. The relative closeness is calculated based on the 
TOPSIS approach with a comparison of the positive ideal solution und the negative ideal 
solution (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) and measure the degree of fulfilment of a standard 
compared to the criteria.  
As the description of a framework is conceptual and the fulfilment is not just a simple yes 
or no, following four catagories (adapted by Chen (2000)) were used: non-fulfilment (0), 
medium fulfilment (3), good fulfilment (7), and very good fulfilment (10). 
• Conducted analysis: The criterion conducted analysis distinguishes between standards 
having their own approach (shown as particular) and standards without (shown as general) 
for threat and risk analysis.  
 
All criteria catalogues contain specific criteria, which are described in the following. 
In the Criteria Catalogue in General, the criteria to calculate the quantitative rating are 
general concepts of threat analysis, general concepts of risk analysis, precise 
realisations of threat analysis, and precise realisations of risk analysis. All criteria were 
weighted equally. 
The criteria general concept of threat analysis and general concept of risk analysis are 
taken as fulfilled, whenever the regarded standard comprises the word risk analysis or 
threat analysis. If the standard considers a precise concept of threat or risk analysis, the 
criterion precise realisation of threat analysis or precise realisation of risk analysis is 
fulfilled. 
 
Overall, 33 criteria are considered in the Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis. These 
criteria are summarised into the categories general criteria, safety measures criteria, 
criteria in Industry 4.0, and criteria of the infrastructure. Table 2 lists the categories 
and their remaining criteria. The categories safety measures criteria, criteria in Industry 
4.0, and criteria of the infrastructure comprise sub criteria and, therefore, their values 
are calculated as a mean of the sub criteria.  
 
  
Comprised Criteria (Weighting) Category Category for Calculation 
Consideration of threats (1/5) 
Approach to identify threats (1/5) 
Definition of ICT goals (1/5) 
ICT as an ongoing process (1/5)  




Safety measures Industry 4.0 (1/2) 




Safety measures total 
(Mean) 
Protection cyber physical systems (1/5) 
Protection IoT (1/5) 
Protection cloud services (1/5) 
Protection Big Data (1/5) 
Protection virtualisation (1/5) 
Criteria in 
Industry 4.0 
Safety measures Industry 
4.0 (Mean) 
Sensitizing employees (1/14) 
Authentication (1/14) 
Protection of networks (1/14) 
Protection office ICT (1/14) 
Protection production ICT (1/14) 
Protection of information on data carrier (1/14) 
Backup (1/14) 
Protection of remote workplace and sales 
(1/14) 
Protection against infected goods (1/14) 
Protection packaging area (1/14) 
Protection of products in shipment (1/14) 
Protection against power outage (1/14) 
Protection against fire/ water damage (1/14) 




Safety measures in 
general (Mean) 
Table 2: Criteria of Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis 
 
The criteria safety measures and consideration of threats are determined in the Criteria 
Catalogue Risk Analysis. These two critera were already examined more precisely in 
the Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis. The criteria consideration of Industry 4.0 
threats examine, whether general threats in Industry 4.0 are considered, and summarises 
the Industry 4.0 criteria of the Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis. Table 3 illustrates 
further criteria, their related category, and their related category for calculation. The 
categories criteria of threats, criteria of analysis, criteria of calculation, and criteria of 
approach comprise sub criteria and, hence, their values are calculated as a mean of the 
sub criteria.  
 
  
Comprised Criteria (Weighting) Category Category for 
Calculation 
General process of risk analysis (1/7) 
Approach risk identification (1/7) 
Business impact analysis (1/7) 
Total threats (1/7) 
Safety analysis total (1/7) 
Calculation total (1/7) 





Consideration of threats (1/3) 
Consideration of Industry 4.0 threats (1/3) 





Particular safety analysis for cloud (1/3) 
Particular safety analysis for IoT (1/3) 






Calculation method (1/2) 





Periodic internal/ external inspection (1/5) 
Adequate protection in accordance to the value of the 
organisation (1/5) 
Adequate protection in accordance to the importance of the 
customer (1/5) 
Reduction of resource consumption of external ICT security 
provider (1/5) 





Table 3: Criteria of Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis 
 
In the criteria catalogues for threat analysis and risk analysis, the general criteria 
category calculates the relative closeness of all main criteria to increase comparability 
of standard. The overall usefulness of one standard is determined by the calculation of 
a total relative closeness of all three criteria catalogues. 
 
4.0 Results 
This section represents the results of comparing the standards based on criteria 
catalogues.  
 
4.1 Criteria Catalogue in General 
In the criteria catalogue in general only 22 of 54 standards are identified as relevant. 
Further eight standards are classified as possibly later relevant and 24 standards as not 
relevant. 
Table 4 illustrates a ranking of all relevant standards. The highest value is reached by 
four standards. The second highest value is reached by IT-Grundschutz; followed by 
the standards ISO/IEC 27000 family, NIST IR 8183A, MORA, IEC 62443-2-1:2010, 
NIST SP 800-82 and TOGAF. The remaining standards reach a relative closeness of 
less than 0.5.  
By considering the criteria conducted analysis, nine of the relevant standards have their 
own approach. Half of the four standards ranked highest have their own approach. IT-
Grundschutz, NIST IR 8183A, and NIST SP 800-82 have also their own approach 
whereas ISO/IEC 27000 family, MORA, IEC 62443-2-1:2010 and TOGAF describe 
general analyses. Half of the standards with the relative closeness of less than 0.5 are 
characterised a general analysis. 
 










1 CORAS General 0 1.21180448 1 
Cyber-Sicherheits-
Exposition 
Particular 0 1.21180448 1 
SDL General 0 1.21180448 1 
VDI/VDE 2182 (1, 
2.2, 2.3, 3.3) 
Particular 0 1.21180448 1 
5 IT-Grundschutz  Particular 0.41043702 0.98808243 0.70652033 
6 ISO/IEC 27000 General 0.54664561 0.77164941 0.58533894 
NIST IR 8183A Particular 0.54664561 0.77164941 0.58533894 
8 MORA General 0.70795684 0.98349744 0.5814508 
9 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 General 0.73234841 0.90887173 0.55377807 
10 NIST SP 800-82 Particular 0.80477847 0.90598107 0.52957826 
TOGAF General 0.80477847 0.90598107 0.52957826 
12 IEC 62443-1-1:2009 General 1.07185413 0.56533071 0.34530659 
ITIL Particular 1.07185413 0.56533071 0.34530659 
PCIDSS  General 1.07185413 0.56533071 0.34530659 
VDI/VDE 2182-4 Particular 1.07185413 0.56533071 0.34530659 
VdS 10000 General 1.07185413 0.56533071 0.34530659 
17 Cobit 2019 Particular 1.18089407 0.27195456 0.18718712 
18 Cyber-Sicherheits-
Check 
Particular 1.14016845 0.2178551 0.16042071 
MOF General 1.14016845 0.2178551 0.16042071 
Table 4: Results of Criteria Catalogue in General 
 
Having considered the criteria in general, the standards are evaluated regarding the 
threat analysis.  
 
4.2 Criteria Catalogue Threat Aanalysis 
The level of abstraction and the missing context of Industry 4.0 cause only 15 of 54 
standards to be classified as relevant. Further six standards were identified as possibly 
later relevant and overall 33 standards were identified as not relevant. 
Table 5 illustrates a ranking of all 15 relevant standards. The highest possible mean 
value of 1 is reached once, namely by IT-Grundschutz, followed by the standards IEC 
62443-2-1:201 and ISO/IEC 27000 family with a relative closeness greater than 0.6. 
NIST IR 8183A, IEC 62443-1-1:2009, and NIST SP 800-72 reach a relative closeness 
around 0.43. The remaining standards have a relative closeness of less than 0.4. 
Seven of the relevant standards have their own approach. IT-Grundschutz (Rank 1), 
NIST IR 8183A (Rank 4), and NIST SP 800-82 (Rank 6) have their own approach 
whereas ISO/IEC 27000 family, IEC 62443-2-1:2010, and IEC 62441-1:2009 describe 
a general analysis. The remaining standards, with a relative closeness of less than 0.4, 
are characterised six times as particular and three times as general. 
 










1 IT-Grundschutz  Particular 0 1.756464291 1 
2 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 General 0.73478431 1.328505547 0.64387732 
3 ISO/IEC 27000 General 0.8814955 1.337949778 0.60283071 
4 NIST IR 8183A Particular 1.37526707 1.064445029 0.43629944 
5 IEC 62443-1-1:2009 General 1.39743441 1.064116483 0.43229514 
6 NIST SP 800-82 Particular 1.26881809 0.95159438 0.42856649 
7 VDI/VDE 2182-2.3 Particular 1.4348162 0.944194686 0.3968854 
8 VDI/VDE 2182-2.2 Particular 1.45607725 0.943824281 0.39327625 
9 VDI/VDE 2182-1 Particular 1.48257608 0.941878423 0.38849086 
10 VDI/VDE 2182-3.3 Particular 1.43232165 0.835717528 0.36847579 
11 SDL General 1.52199188 0.876759674 0.36550666 
12 ITIL Particular 1.50548655 0.826868428 0.35452083 
13 VdS 10000 General 1.37243552 0.725103176 0.3456924 
14 Cyber-Sicherheits-
Check 
Particular 1.52711656 0.689172807 0.31095795 
15 CORAS General 1.5602195 0.65151513 0.29457202 
Table 5: Results of Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis 
 
Having considered the criteria in general and the Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis, 
the standards will be evaluated regarding the risk analysis. 
 
4.3 Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis  
The level of abstraction and the missing context in Industry 4.0 cause only 15 of 54 
standards to be classified as relevant. Further six standards are identified as possibly 
later relevant and 33 standards are identified as not relevant. 
Table 6 illustrates a ranking of all relevant standards. IT-Grundschutz is ranked highest. 
All other standards reach a relative closeness of less than 0.4. Overall, nine of the 
relevant standards have their own approach. 
 










1 IT-Grundschutz  Particular 0.659519415 1.572547555 0.704525257 
2 NIST IR 8183A Particular 1.400962061 0.891849727 0.388976423 
3 IEC 62443-1-
1:2009 
General 1.431278808 0.854642588 0.373872255 
4 ISO/IEC 27000 General 1.443396147 0.742170033 0.339577927 
5 CORAS Particular 1.48311622 0.739291945 0.332653541 
6 SDL Particular 1.470562601 0.706063796 0.324384468 
7 ITIL Particular 1.585101215 0.632144387 0.285103457 
8 TOGAF Particular 1.605954185 0.607783494 0.27455082 
9 VDI/VDE 
2182-1 




Particular 1.61805214 0.605968888 0.272465449 
11 IEC 62443-2-
1:2010 
General 1.47779795 0.466171916 0.239804085 
12 VDI/VDE 2182 
(2.2, 2.3, 3.3) 
Particular 1.595475334 0.502729993 0.239599998 
13 VdS 10000 General 1.533348761 0.309379269 0.167891986 
Table 6: Results of Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis 
 
4.4 Summary of all Criteria Catalogues  
The results of all three criteria catalogues vary regarding the considered standards. 
Thus, this section compares the results of all of the criteria catalogues with respect to 
relevance, relative closeness, and conducted analysis. 
 
Table 7 compares all relevant standards of the three criteria catalogues based on their 
relevance. The usage of a considered standard is defined as conflict-free if the standard 
is characterised as relevant in all criteria catalogues. In contrast, the usage of a standard 
is defined as conflictual if at least in one criteria catalogues the standard is characterised 
as not relevant, such as MORA. Overall, nine standards contain such conflict. 
Seven standards, namely Cyber-Sicherheits-Exposition, PCIDSS, COBIT 2019, MOF, 
TOGAF, VDI/VDE 2182-4, and MORA, are characterised as relevant in the Criteria 
Catalogue in General; whereas these standards are characterised as not relevant in the 
Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis. The standards ISO 31000 and FITSAF are 
characterised as possibly later relevant in the Criteria Catalogue in General but are 
characterised as not relevant in the Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis.  
Seven standards, namely Cyber-Sicherheits-Check, PCIDSS, COBIT 2019, MOF, 
VDI/VDE 2182-4, NIST SP 800-82, and MORA, are characterised as relevant in the 
Criteria Catalogue in General; whereas these standards are characterised as not 
relevant in the Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis. The standards ISO 31000 and FITSAF 
are characterised as possibly later relevant in the Criteria Catalogue in General; 
whereas these standards are characterised as not relevant in the Criteria Catalogue Risk 
Analysis. Reasons for the change of the relevance between the criteria catalogues could 
be the lack of specific threat or risk descriptions. 
Only those standards, which are characterised as relevant in all criteria catalogues, will 
be considered further. The remaining standards in Table 7 are not relevant to the 
approach of threat and risk analysis, since a conflict exists.  
 










Cobit 2019 Relevant Not relevant Not relevant Yes 
CORAS Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
Cyber-Sicherheits-Check Relevant Relevant Not relevant Yes 
Cyber-Sicherheits-Exposition Relevant Not relevant Relevant Yes 
IEC 62443-1-1:2009 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
IEC 62443-2-1:2010 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
ISO/IEC 27000 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
IT-Grundschutz  Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
ITIL Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
MOF Relevant Not relevant Not relevant Yes 
MORA  Relevant Not relevant Not relevant Yes 
NIST IR 8183A Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
NIST SP 800-82 Relevant Relevant Not relevant Yes 
PCIDSS  Relevant Not relevant Not relevant Yes 
SDL Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
TOGAF Relevant Not relevant Relevant Yes 
VDI/VDE 2182-1 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
VDI/VDE 2182-2.2 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
VDI/VDE 2182-2.3 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
VDI/VDE 2182-3.3 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
VDI/VDE 2182-4 Relevant Not relevant Not relevant Yes 
VdS 10000 Relevant Relevant Relevant No 
Table 7: Comparison Relevance of all Criteria Catalogues 
 
The relevant standards are now considered in more detail by comparing all criteria 
catalogues (see Table 8). This comparison is conducted by mean values of all relevant 
standards. The relative closeness of all three criteria catalogues is calculated as one 
mean value over all criteria catalogues for a single standard. 
The highest relative closeness is reached by IT-Grundschutz, followed by SDL. 
VDI/VDE 2182 are ranked at positions three, four, five, and seven. VDI/VDE 2182 
standards are followed by CORAS and the international standard ISO/IEC 27000, and 
IEC 62443-2-1:2010. NIST IR 8183A is ranked after the IEC 62443-2-1:201. The 
lowest relative closeness, smaller than 0.4, is obtained by IEC 62443-1-1:2009, ITIL, 
and VdS 10000. 
To have an additional measure, the standard deviation represents the mismatch among 
the relevance of all three criteria catalogues. The smaller the mismatch among the 
relevance, the higher the consistency within the standard with respect to the abstraction 
level. 
 
Rank Name Total Relative Closeness 
Mean SD 
1 IT-Grundschutz  0.803681863 0.138820275 
2 SDL 0.563297043 0.309251637 
3 VDI/VDE 2182-1 0.55402856 0.318818829 
4 VDI/VDE 2182-2.3 0.545495133 0.327735341 
5 VDI/VDE 2182-2.2 0.544292084 0.328284812 
6 CORAS 0.542408519 0.323939318 
7 VDI/VDE 2182-3.3 0.536025263 0.332271636 
8 ISO/IEC 27000 0.509249193 0.120188032 
9 IEC 62443-2-1:2010 0.47915316 0.17319633 
10 NIST IR 8183A 0.470204936 0.08367296 
11 IEC 62443-1-1:2009 0.383824661 0.036203497 
12 ITIL 0.328310293 0.030782555 
13 VdS 10000 0.28629699 0.083725129 
Table 8. Results TOPSIS Method 
 
Further, the standards are examined based on our conducted analysis in the particular 
criteria catalogues. The standards consider a particular analysis or a general analysis. If 
a standard considers both types, it should be evaluated which analysis will be 
conducted. Both types of conducted analysis are considered in SDL and CORAS (see 
Table 4, Table 5, Table 6). The remaining standards consider either a general analysis 
or a particular analysis. 
  
5.0 Discussion 
This section represents the evaluation of the results of the criteria catalogues. Further, 
the defined research question will be answered in the subsections and limitations will 
be outlined. 
 
5.1 Standards in Information System 
To answer RQ1 (Which well-known standards consider threat and risk analysis?) 62 
standards in various subjects areas were considered. To distinguish between various 
fields of application, the standards were categorised into open standards, fee-based 
standards, practical guidance, service management, and external provider. Almost at 
least one standard was identified in every category as relevant. Several standards do not 
elaborate on risk analysis. Even fewer standards consider Industry 4.0 in risk analysis. 
There are no established and practice-oriented standards of threat and risk analysis in 
Industry 4.0, yet (Hofmann and Rüsch, 2017; Bundesministerium für Bildung und 
Forschung). Thus, further standards from continuous areas of ICT security were 
considered. As many relevant standards as possible were determined in a literature 
review.  
Only 13 standards were defined as overall relevant from the three criteria catalogues 
(see Table 8). The relative closeness of the relevant standards was defined which 
describes to what extent the criteria are fulfilled. These standards were ranked 
according to the results of the relative closeness.  
IT-Grundschutz as an open standard with practical guidance is the best performer. The 
second best performer is SDL known from service management; followed by five 
standards of practical guidance. The first fee-based standard is placed at a lower rank.  
The standards show different levels of abstraction. In our evaluation, they were 
compared on similar abstraction levels which makes the standards comparable. Due to 
the defined criteria, some well-known standards such as COBIT 2019 were 
characterised as not relevant. These results are based on the conduct of threat and risk 
analysis in Industry 4.0 and thus do not question the quality of the standards themselves.  
 
  
5.2 Criteria to Evaluate Standards 
Answering RQ2 (Which criteria are used to evaluate the standards?), several criteria 
were defined. To increase transparency, several criteria were summarised to a main 
topic, such as criteria in Industry 4.0, criteria of threats, and criteria of analysis. 
The criteria of the criteria catalogues were verified regarding to their quality by the 
adaption of quality criteria of the requirements engineering (Ebert, 2014; Denger and 
Olsson, 2005). The focus on the quality check is the comparison of the criteria in various 
criteria catalogues.  
The criteria relevance and quantitative rating evaluate the standards regarding to their 
importance, which constitutes the necessity of the criteria (Ebert, 2014). 
To verify the criteria catalogues various criteria were evaluated in more than one criteria 
catalogue. The criteria consideration of threats, consideration of Industry 4.0 threats, 
and safety measures were considered in both Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis and 
Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis. These criteria are identical regarding to their content 
and characteristics and, therefore, satisfy the quality criteria consistency and 
unambiguousness (Ebert, 2014; Denger and Olsson, 2005). 
The Criteria Catalogue in General already considers whether the standards describe a 
threat analysis and a risk analysis in general. The Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis 
specifies in particular whether and to what extent the standard considers a threat 
analysis; the same procedure applies to risk analysis. The remaining criteria are 
identical with respect to their content and characteristics and thus satisfy the quality 
criteria consistency and unambiguousness (Ebert, 2014; Denger and Olsson, 2005). 
 
The Criteria Catalogue Threat Analysis considers various criteria regarding specific 
threats, e.g. Industry 4.0 threats. These criteria evaluate the relevance of the considered 
standard and are therefore relevant regarding to the quality criteria (Ebert, 2014). 
The Criteria Catalogue Risk Analysis considers various criteria, such as approach to 
identify risk, consider threats, and calculate risk values. These criteria evaluate the 
relevance of the considered standard and thus are relevant regarding to the quality 
criteria (Ebert, 2014). 
 
  
5.3 Evaluation the Criteria Catalogues  
To answer RQ3 (Which results are provided with the criteria catalogues?), the results 
of the three criteria catalogues were summarised and evaluated. Overall, only 13 
standards can be characterised as relevant in all criteria catalogues.  
By using TOPSIS, the relative closeness of a standard to the criteria in the criteria 
catalogues were calculated. The results of the standards in the single criteria catalogues 
varied (see Table 4, Table 5, Table 6).  
To evaluate the relevance of a standard, a total relative closeness was calculated from 
the relative closeness of all criteria catalogues. The total relative closeness is calculated 
as a mean value of the relative closeness of the criteria catalogues. The results show 
that both, mean and standard deviation, of the relative closeness vary significantly.  
IT-Grundschutz reaches the best relative closeness by far with a value of around 0.8 
and a standard deviation of around 0.13. IT-Grundschutz is characterised as practice-
oriented and particular. Further, IT-Grundschutz is edited annually and already 
considers security in Industry 4.0 components (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik, 2020). However, IT-Grundschutz does not provide any 
calculation methods for risk analysis but describes concrete measures to reduce risk. 
IT-Grundschutz is followed by SDL with a significant discrepancy between the total 
relative closeness of around 0.26 and the standard deviation. This standard is around 
the medium value and, therefore, the criteria are fulfilled as on a medium level. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation indicates a mismatch of the usefulness rated in the 
single criteria catalogues. SDL and CORAS use both general and particular analyses. 
Therefore, two analyses have to be conducted. CORAS is ranked on position six with 
a relative closeness of around 0.54. 
Rank three to five and seven are taken by the relevant VDI/VDE 2182 standards. These 
standards are very similar; hence, the relative closeness and the standard deviation are 
not distinct. However, the standard deviation of these standards shows the greatest value 
of all fourteen considered standards. Consequently, the criteria demonstrate an 
inconsistent abstraction level within the standard. 
The international standards, ISO/IEC 27000 and IEC 62443-2-1:2010 are located in the 
second half of the ranking. These standards define generic approaches for threat and 
risk analysis; hence, the criteria of particular threats and risk specification are not 
fulfilled. The relative low standard deviations of these standards are clarified by the 
consistent abstraction level within the standard.  
NIST IR 8183A specifies a particular analysis and a specific method to calculate risk. 
Further approaches are partially linked to other documents (Stouffer et al., 2015; 
Stouffer et al. 2019a). The relative low standard deviation demonstrates a consistent 
partial fulfilment within the standard.  
IEC 62443-1-1:2009, ITIL, and VdS 10000 reach the lowest standard deviation but also 
the lowest relative closeness with values lower than 0.4.  
The first seven standards contain at least a partial particular analysis. Hence, standards 
with at least a partial particular analysis perform better than standards with a general 
analysis. This is due to the more specific description of the approach and examples of 
threats and risks.  
The Criteria Catalogue in General shows on a general level whether threat and risk 
analysis are considered. The actual usefulness of the standards is considered in the two 
remaining criteria catalogues.  
Especially the relative closeness of seven standards in the Criteria Catalogue Risk 
Analysis is less than 0.3. Hence, these standards are limited in their support for a risk 
analysis and other approaches have to be applied.  
Furthermore, only a few standards consider Industry 4.0. None of the international ISO, 
IEC, and ISO/IEC standards considers methods for a precise approach. Therefore, 
further approaches have to be searched to identify threats and perform a risk analysis. 
IT-Grundschutz considers precise security measures, also for Industry 4.0, and it is 
updated annually. Hence, IT-Grundschutz is the most suitable standard.  
 
5.4 Limitations 
The literature review strives to adapt all relevant and well-known standards to conduct 
threat and risk analysis. Since there are no established standards for Industry 4.0 and 
threats and risk analysis as yet, standards will be adjusted or generated in the future. 
Standards often require additional documents to be applied to the approach. Therefore, 
related standards and the corresponding documents should be evaluated together.  
The standards were evaluated based on a generic use case considering Industry 4.0. 
Based on the relevance of the standards to a particular organisation the criteria 




A literature review was conducted to obtain an overview of various standards with the 
utilisation of threat and risk analysis in Industry 4.0. All in all, 62 standards were 
considered.  
Criteria catalogues were created and standards were applied to the criteria catalogues 
to evaluate them. To have a quantitative measure of the standards fulfilling the criteria 
from all three catalogues, the TOPSIS method was used to calculate the degree of 
relevance as relative closeness. The results of the criteria catalogues were summarised 
and ranked according to the degree of relevance.  
Thirteen standards remained as relevant of all considered standard. The highest ranked 
standard and the only standard that considers Industry 4.0, is IT-Grundschutz. Even IT-
Grundschutz does not completely fulfil the criteria, since this standard does not consider 
methods to calculate risk.  
Future research must develop a literature-based approach for standards with a general 
analysis. Furthermore, the identified standards must be applied in practice and their 
degree of suitability must be applied in practical scenarios. Based on these results, a 
generic standard for risk and threats analysis in Industry 4.0 can be designed.  
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